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Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans 
do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new 
challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have 
strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming 
responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive 
functions of blame. The new challenge is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or
less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is 
inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to 
meet this challenge.
I. Introduction
Imagine that you ask your partner to buy your favorite chocolate when they go to the grocery 
store, and they promise to do so and then come home with some fresh fruit instead of chocolate, 
telling you that you wanted to lose weight anyway. This is not a matter of life and death, but 
when you realize what happened, it seems likely and—from the perspective of everyday life—
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appropriate for you to blame your partner in an angry way.
Many authors contend that there is something morally problematic about responding with
angry blame to the conduct of other people. Most prominently, skeptics about free will claim that
your blame response would be inappropriate--in the sense of unfair, unjust, or undeserved--
because humans do not have the kind of control that is necessary for it being fair, just, or 
deserved to blame them. Others contend that humans do not have the kind of knowledge that is 
necessary for it being fair, deserved, or just to blame them. Typically, authors who accept one of 
these positions conclude that we have strong reasons, grounded in fairness, desert, or justice, to 
abandon our blame practice or that we should actually do so.1 I will call this position blame 
skepticism.2
A prominent line of reasoning inspired by Peter Strawson3 objects to blame skepticism 
that a life without angry blame would be bad and that this is a very strong reason to hold on to 
our blame practices.4 Many blame skeptics reply that it is possible to have a good life without 
blame. In particular, they claim that there are non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, 
such as a certain kind of disappointment, that play all the positive roles that blame plays. The aim
of this paper is to critically discuss this position.
I will first present and defend the view that disappointment can play the positive roles of 
blame (sections II and III). Then, I will argue that its proponents are confronted with an 
overlooked challenge. Blame skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or at least less 
inappropriate) in the sense of fairness, desert, or justice to respond with this kind of 
disappointment to what agents do, even if it would be inappropriate to blame them (section IV). I
will argue that showing this is much harder than one might think (sections V and VI).
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One note of caution is in order. There are many versions of blame skepticism and 
different skeptics suggest different alternatives to blame. I will not be able to do justice to all of 
them. My goal is much more specific. I will focus on the blame-skeptical proposal that we have 
strong reason--grounded in fairness, desert, or justice--to replace blame with disappointment, and
I will present and discuss a problem for this view. I will point out in the final section how some 
of the things I say about disappointment can be adopted for other possible alternatives to blame, 
such as sadness or regret. But my focus will be on angry blame and disappointment because 
many skeptics seem to think that disappointment is especially well-suited to play the positive 
roles of blame.
II. Blame and Its Valuable Roles
Can there be a good life without blame? In order to answer this question, we need a better 
understanding of blame and its positive roles. As the notion of blame is highly contested, 
however, I will focus on what appears to be the or at least one standard account of blame.5
According to a popular picture, to blame another person is to be angry at her in a certain 
way.6 First, anger emotions are typically thought of as partly consisting in or as being closely 
associated with certain feelings, especially a certain kind of heat and tension that supervene on 
an increased heart rate and skin temperature. Second, emotions are typically taken to partly 
consist in or to be closely associated with certain representations. On one view, to blame a person
in an angry way involves or is associated with representing her as lacking goodwill.7 Others say 
that blame involves or is typically accompanied by the representation that the blamee deserves to
be the target of anger.8 Third, angry blame is closely associated with or involves hostility and the 
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tendency to retaliate, attack, take revenge on, or aggressively confront the blamee.9 Very often, 
this kind of angry blame is identified with the paradigmatic Strawsonian reactive attitudes, 
resentment and indignation.10
It is widely assumed and plausible that to angrily blame a person typically has a sting in 
the sense that it sets back the interests of the blamee.11 We typically care about whether or not our
friends, family, colleagues, and neighbors angrily blame us or our loved ones. We hope that they 
do not feel and think this way, we fear that they do, and we feel bad when we learn that they do. 
We typically have good reason to avoid being the target of these attitudes, and to explain, excuse,
or justify ourselves when we are blamed. Similarly, two people who are identical with the only 
difference being that the friends, family, and colleagues of the second blame her seem to differ 
with regard to how good their lives are, even if the second never realizes that she is being 
blamed. Thus, it seems plausible that blaming people is, typically, bad for them. In what follows, 
I will only be concerned with blame that sets back its targets’ interests in one of these or 
relevantly similar ways.
It is natural to think that the harm of blame explains why it is morally inappropriate in the
sense of unfair, undeserved, or unjust to stingingly blame random people (more on this in section
5). Agents must fulfill certain conditions, most prominently some control and knowledge 
conditions, for it to be appropriate to blame them. Blame skeptics add that humans do not fulfill 
them. Therefore, they conclude, blame is always unfair, undeserved, or unjust.
Now, one may take the blame skeptic to claim that we should get rid of our emotional 
involvement as much as we can and cultivate cold and “rational” responses, sometimes called the
objective attitude.12 However, many defenders of blame argue that angry blame also plays 
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important and valuable roles such that we would lose something important and valuable if we 
completely stopped blaming. They contend that we have, therefore, much stronger reason to hold
on to our blame practices.
First, some argue that blame is itself communicative, or motivates us in an especially 
suitable way to communicate to others that we morally disapprove of and do not accept their 
behavior or quality of will.13 And a life without blame would, then, lack this important kind of 
communication or it would at least be much harder to communicate in this way.14
Second, some blame defenders suggest that we are unable or that it would be extremely 
hard to take other agents seriously if we completely got rid of our tendency to blame them. 
Roughly, part of what it is to take a person seriously, the idea goes, is to be disposed to respond 
with certain emotions to their slighting of us. Thus, without such a disposition, we would not 
take people seriously. And, for the same reason, it would almost be impossible to form close 
relationships with them.15
Third, some authors contend that getting rid of blame would necessarily have the 
consequence that we would lose an especially apt way of taking to heart moral values and norms.
Again, part of what it is to care about something is to be ready to have negative emotions when it
is disrespected, violated, and so on. Thus, not being disposed in this way when moral values are 
disrespected and moral norms violated would be an expression of not caring about morality.16 
And, plausibly, not caring about morality would be a bad thing.
Blame may play other positive roles as well,17 but in what follows I will focus on these 
three because they seem to be the most famous ones, and it seems very plausible that blame 
really fulfills these valuable functions. How can blame skeptics reply?
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III. Disappointment and Its Valuable Roles
Many blame skeptics claim that a life without blame can be good. They could try to argue that 
the functions of blame presented above are not as important as defenders of blame want us to 
believe. But in what follows I will put this response aside. Rather, I will focus on a skeptical 
view that accepts that blame plays these positive roles. The view, then, argues for what I will call
the replacement thesis:18 for each positive role that blame plays, there is a non-blaming response 
or mix of responses that plays this role sufficiently well. If the replacement thesis is true, then 
there can be a good life without blame. In this section I will present and defend the replacement 
thesis.
Prominent skeptics contend that emotions such as disappointment, regret, sadness, or 
grief, perhaps in combination with certain desires or other attitudes, are apt to play the positive 
roles of angry blame. As noted in the introduction, I will focus on disappointment as the 
paradigmatic replacement for blame. Derk Pereboom, for example, says:
One might note that expressions of resentment and indignation play an important 
communicative role in our personal and societal relationships, and object that if we were 
to strive to modify or eliminate them, such relationships might well be worse off. But 
when someone is mistreated in a relationship there are other emotions typically present 
whose expressions are not threatened by the skeptical view, and can also communicate 
the relevant information. These emotions include feeling disappointed [ . . .].19
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The idea is that your current tendency to blame your partner when they break their promises 
should not be replaced by a tendency to respond in an unemotional, detached fashion. Rather, 
you should cultivate the tendency to respond with disappointment.
Blame defenders can reply that it is implausible that any garden-variety of 
disappointment could play the valuable roles that blame plays.20 Note, for example, that you can 
be disappointed when your favorite team loses even though the players gave their very best and 
played as well as they could. But responding in such a way to your partner not buying chocolate 
is not an adequate replacement for blame. This kind of disappointment does not communicate 
disapproval of what they did because you do not disapprove of anyone’s behavior when you are 
disappointed about the loss of your favorite team if they played as well as they could. Being 
disappointed about the loss of your team also does not express non-acceptance of the team’s 
quality of will, and it does not express a commitment to morality. You know that they gave their 
best, did not lack goodwill, and that they did not do anything morally problematic. Thus, blame 
defenders conclude, this form of disappointment is too different from blame. If you are 
disappointed about not getting chocolate in the same way in which you are disappointed about 
the loss of your team, then this is not a way of taking your partner and the norm to not break 
promises seriously; it merely expresses that you take having chocolate seriously. This suggests 
that garden-variety disappointment does not play the positive roles of blame sufficiently well.
Again, skeptics could reply that there is nothing especially good about responding to an 
agent performing objectionable actions in a directed, communicative way that expresses a 
commitment to morality and non-acceptance of the agent’s quality of will. But, again, I will 
leave this option aside. First, it seems plausible that a response that has these features is valuable.
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A close friendship or partnership, for example, in which one never responds to objectionable 
conduct in directed, communicative, and expressive ways that reflect commitment to moral 
values and norms, like the norm to keep promises, does not look very attractive. Second, and 
importantly, skeptics can and in fact do accept that responding in such a way is valuable. For 
example, Pereboom defends the replacement thesis by depicting a non-blaming practice of 
responding to objectionable conduct, which involves directed, communicative, and protesting 
responses to an agent expressing a lack of goodwill.21
Thus, in order to flesh out the replacement thesis, blame skeptics should not propose just 
any kind of disappointment as an alternative to blame because many forms of disappointment 
cannot play the valuable roles of angry blame sufficiently well. A more promising blame-
skeptical account says that the relevant kind of disappointment must be shaped in such a way that
it responds to agents, their lack of goodwill, their disrespect for moral values, or their violation 
of moral norms—just as resentment is typically thought of as a kind of anger that is shaped in 
this way.22 In what follows I will call the shaped kind of disappointment agential 
disappointment.23
Here is a picture of disappointment. Disappointment is associated with or partly consists 
in feeling empty, being abandoned, or powerless.24 Moreover, disappointment represents or is 
closely associated with the representation that a desire has unexpectedly not been fulfilled or that
what one has hoped for does not obtain.25 The shaped kind of disappointment that could replace 
angry blame would then represent an agent as not having the goodwill one has desired and 
expected her to have or that one has hoped for. Alternatively, agential disappointment could also 
involve or be typically accompanied by the representation that the targeted agent deserves to be 
9
the target of one’s disappointment. Finally, agential disappointment involves or is closely 
associated with withdrawal. More precisely, agential disappointment is associated with the 
“tendency to get away from the situation, to ignore and to avoid the other person [ . . . and to] 
want to be far away from the person.”26
Skeptics should argue that a suitably shaped kind of agential disappointment, perhaps in 
combination with certain desires or other attitudes that one should also cultivate, communicates 
or expresses that you do not accept the blamee’s conduct or quality of will. It expresses your 
taking her and what she does seriously, and it is an expression of your apt commitment to the 
values and norms of morality. Thus, skeptics should say, a shaped kind of disappointment—
perhaps together with other attitudes—plays the valuable roles that blame plays in our lives to a 
sufficient degree. Therefore, skeptics conclude, we can get rid of our tendency to blame without 
necessarily losing anything essential for a good life. We can replace angry blame with agential 
disappointment.
To sum up, many defenders of blame object to blame skepticism by claiming that a life 
without blame cannot be good. Against this, I have argued for the replacement thesis: for every 
positive role played by blame, there is a non-blaming alternative attitude or a mix of attitudes 
that plays this role sufficiently well. One plausible candidate is a kind of disappointment that is 
shaped, similar to the way in which resentment is a shaped kind of anger.
IV. A New Challenge for Blame Skepticism
So far, I have argued that a blame-free life can be good if we replace blame by agential 
disappointment, perhaps in combination with other attitudes. Now, assume that it would be 
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unfair, undeserved, or unjust to blame your partner for breaking their promise to buy chocolate. 
Would it then be fair, deserved, or just––or at least less unfair, undeserved, or unjust––to respond
with agential disappointment to what they did? Blame-skeptical proponents of the replacement 
thesis that I have developed so far need to contend that it would be. But is this plausible?
Imagine situations in which others are disappointed with you. For example, your vegan 
friend is disappointed with you when she sees you eating a hamburger. Or imagine that your 
sibling turns away from you when you make one of the hurtful remarks that sometimes slip off 
your tongue. Or imagine that your partner is disappointed with you when you tell them that you 
are canceling a family weekend trip or when you forget to buy a birthday present. Or imagine 
that your parents tell you that you have disappointed them as their child.
If we vividly imagine situations of this kind, we should realize that being the target of 
agential disappointment has a sting in the sense that it sets back the target’s interests. We 
typically care about whether or not our friends, family, colleagues, and neighbors are agentially 
disappointed with us or our loved ones. We hope that they do not feel and think this way, we fear 
that they do, and we feel bad when we learn that they do. Moreover, we typically have good 
reason to avoid being the target of agential disappointment, and to explain, excuse, or justify 
ourselves when we are. Two people who are identical with the only difference being that the 
friends, family, and colleagues of the second are agentially disappointed with her seem to differ 
with regard to how good their lives are, even if the second never realizes that she is the target of 
this kind of disappointment. Thus, when we imagine situations of this kind, we should realize 
that agential disappointment often has a sting in the sense that it sets back the interests of its 
target. Others being agentially disappointed with us, especially in close relationships, can be a 
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heavy burden.27
As I have suggested in section II, the same is true for angry blame. Blame can be and 
typically is bad for the blamee. And because of blame’s badness, it is morally inappropriate to 
blame any random person. It is unfair, unjust, or undeserved to expose someone to the burden of 
blame unless she fulfills certain conditions.
Once it is clear that agential disappointment and blame both have a sting in the sense that 
they tend to set back the interests of their targets, a natural question arises for the skeptic: if it is 
morally inappropriate to expose people to blame’s sting because they do not fulfill the control or 
knowledge condition for appropriate blame, why should it then be more appropriate to expose 
them to agential disappointment’s sting? More precisely, the challenge for the blame skeptic is to
show that blaming a person has a feature that is such that it is inappropriate to blame people 
when they do not fulfill certain control or knowledge conditions, and that agential 
disappointment does not have this or a sufficiently similar feature.
This is an important challenge. Imagine for a moment that no human has free will such 
that blame is always inappropriate. Imagine also that blame and agential disappointment are 
identical in all respects that are relevant for fairness, desert, or justice. Finally, imagine that only 
angry blame and agential disappointment play the positive roles depicted in the previous 
sections. Then, responding with agential disappointment would be as unfair, unjust, or 
undeserved as responding with blame, and we would be in a trap. Either we prioritize fairness, 
desert, or justice, and try to get rid of our tendencies toward blame and agential disappointment 
and, thereby, sacrifice an important part of a good life--or we prioritize a good life and opt for a 
practice that involves unfair, undeserved, or unjust responses, namely, blame or agential 
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disappointment. This is a highly unattractive position. Moreover, we would have no reason 
grounded in fairness, desert, or justice to replace blame with agential disappointment in such a 
world. Admittedly, blame would be inappropriate in this sense. But since agential disappointment
would be just as inappropriate as blame, it would be pointless to replace the latter with the 
former.
In fact, however, blame skeptics claim that we have good reason grounded in fairness, 
desert, or justice to replace blame with non-blaming alternatives like agential disappointment, 
especially if no human has free will. In order to justify this position, blame skeptics need to 
develop an account of blame and the non-blaming alternative that explains why it should be 
appropriate (or at least less inappropriate) to respond with this alternative even if it is 
inappropriate to blame. This is a largely overlooked and, as I will show in the remainder of the 
paper, difficult task.
V. Why Agential Disappointment Is Not More Appropriate Than Blame
In what follows, I will discuss and reject three attempts to argue for the claim that blame has a 
feature that is such that it is inappropriate to blame people when they do not fulfill certain control
or knowledge conditions and that agential disappointment does not have this or a sufficiently 
similar feature. One argument will be based on the action tendency, and the other two will be 
based on the representational dimension of the two responses.
Consider, first, the action tendency of angry blame, which is to retaliate, attack, take 
revenge on, or aggressively confront the blamee. In light of these angry blame-typical forms of 
behavior, the skeptic may contend that the requirements that an agent must fulfill for it to be 
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morally appropriate to angrily blame her are more demanding than the requirements that she has 
to fulfill for it to be morally appropriate to be agentially disappointed with her. The action 
tendency of angry blame, she may say, is much worse for the target. And, correspondingly, the 
appropriateness requirements are more demanding.
But is the action tendency of angry blame really worse? Compare some everyday 
examples of behavior that is expressive of agential disappointment and angry blame. Your 
partner gives you a cold goodnight kiss or aggressively turns off the light; your colleague does 
not greet you in the hallway or slams the door; your sibling sighs disappointedly or gives you a 
confrontational look; your parents whisper disappointedly or yell angrily.
If it is true that the actions associated with angry blame are worse than those associated 
with disappointment, then we should have a preference for being the target of the disappointment
responses rather than the angry blame responses. But I find this far from clear. Indeed, it even 
seems plausible to have a preference for the angry blame responses. Disappointed withdrawal 
has the flavor of writing someone off that is not part of anger. The former seems to express that 
the target is a hopeless case.28 This is a very stinging response. And, therefore, it seems easier to 
cool down hot anger than to heat up cold disappointment.
Perhaps the flavor of writing someone off is not an essential element of behavior that 
expresses agential disappointment. Then, the skeptic could suggest that we should cultivate a 
kind of agential disappointment that does not have it. But what would the resulting form of 
agential disappointment look like? What would its action tendency be if not withdrawal? And 
would the resulting response be able to serve the valuable functions that blame serves? So far, I 
have not seen a skeptic-friendly account of agential disappointment that answers these questions. 
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And, therefore, I have not seen an account of the action tendency of blame and disappointment 
that helps the skeptic to show that blame has a feature that explains blame’s inappropriateness 
when people lack a kind of knowledge or control and that is such that agential disappointment 
does not have this feature.
Second, some may try to meet the challenge by focusing on the representational 
dimensions of angry blame and agential disappointment. Pereboom, for example, says about the 
paradigmatic instances of blame:
[T]he attitudes of moral resentment and indignation include the following two 
components: anger targeted at an agent because of what he’s done or failed to do, and a 
belief that the agent deserves to be the target of that very anger just because of what he 
has done or failed to do.29
Skeptics add that humans do not have the kind of control or knowledge that is necessary for it 
being the case that they deserve angry blame. If this is true, then the belief component of blame 
is always false. By contrast, being agentially disappointed with others surely does not involve the
representation that they deserve blame. Therefore, these skeptics conclude that agential 
disappointment can be representationally correct, while blame always involves a false belief.
The problem with this line of thinking is that it does not even address the challenge at 
issue. Recall that the challenge for skeptics is to show that blaming a person has a feature that is 
such that it is unfair, undeserved, or unjust to blame people because they do not fulfill certain 
control or knowledge conditions and that agential disappointment does not have this or a 
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sufficiently similar feature. The account of the representational dimension of blame that I have 
just sketched does not help the skeptic to meet this challenge. It assumes that blame is 
undeserved if the target of blame lacks a certain kind of control or knowledge. But it does not say
what it is about blame that makes it undeserved in such a case. Yet, this is what the skeptic needs.
To put it differently, the skeptical view under consideration says that blame involves the belief 
that blaming the target is deserved. Therefore, the belief is false if the agent does not fulfill a 
necessary condition for deserved blame. But this does not answer the question of what it is about 
blame that makes it undeserved if the target does not fulfill this condition. And this is the 
question that is at issue.
Perhaps, the representational dimension of blame and agential disappointment points to a 
third way for the skeptic to meet the challenge. So far, I have presented the skeptic as saying that 
blame involves the belief that blaming the blamee is deserved and that this belief is false. One 
may try to develop a slightly different picture. One could say that blame involves representing 
the blamee as having a property that she does not have—such as free will or a kind of knowledge
—and that incorrectly representing agents in this way is unfair, undeserved, or unjust. The 
skeptic could add that agential disappointment does not involve an incorrect representation and 
is, therefore, not inappropriate in this sense.
A proponent of this view would have to show more clearly how representing a person as 
having a property that she does not have can be unfair, undeserved, or unjust in addition to being 
representationally incorrect. But let us assume, for the sake of the argument, that this is so. The 
problem for this blame-skeptical reply is, then, that it seems implausible that this aspect of blame
makes blaming people problematic in the way skeptics claim it to be. To see this, assume that we
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are skeptics and are trying to reshape our responsibility practices in order to make them more 
appropriate in the sense of fairness, desert, or justice. The view under consideration says that if 
humans lack free will or a certain kind of knowledge, then blaming humans is inappropriate 
because it involves the incorrect representation that they have free will or this kind of 
knowledge. According to this picture, we could make our practice appropriate by getting rid of 
the representational element of blame. Thus, our whole practice could stay exactly as it is—
aggressive, confrontational, hostile, demanding, and so on—with the only difference being that 
we do not represent the targets of our responses as having the relevant property. There would be 
no need to replace anger with disappointment. We would just need to develop a form of anger 
with a slightly different representational content.
I find this implausible. If our blame practice is morally inappropriate because we lack 
free will or a certain kind of knowledge, then our practice does not become appropriate simply 
by not representing agents as having free will or this kind of knowledge. If our blame practice is 
unfair, undeserved, or unjust, then, from the perspective of fairness, desert, or justice, some more
radical reform is called-for.
To sum up, the skeptic who proposes agential disappointment (perhaps in combination 
with other attitudes) as an alternative to blame is confronted with the question of why it should 
be appropriate (or at least less inappropriate) to respond with agential disappointment to people’s
conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. I have discussed three skeptical replies, and 
I have argued that they are not convincing.
VI. The Blame Skeptic’s Task
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Skeptics may respond to the line of thinking presented above by proposing to replace blame with
a less stinging response, such as a basic kind of sadness or regret, similar to the sadness or regret 
that you experience when your favorite team loses. It is plausible that these responses do not 
have the sting that angry blame and agential disappointment have because they do not express 
moral disapproval and non-acceptance of a poor quality of will, and they do not necessarily 
express that one takes an agent’s misconduct seriously. As these things—disapproval, non-
acceptance of quality of will, taking a misconduct seriously—are typically stinging, it may be 
morally appropriate to respond with, for example, a basic kind of sadness or regret even if it is 
unfair, undeserved, or unjust to respond with angry blame and agential disappointment.
However, there are good reasons to think that basic sadness and regret are unable to play 
the valuable roles of blame to a sufficient degree. As I have just said, they do not express moral 
disapproval, non-acceptance of the targets’ quality of will, or that one takes a misconduct 
seriously. These aspects of blame are not only stinging; blame defenders have argued 
convincingly that they are also important for a good life (see sections II and III).
Skeptics may propose that we should develop a shaped kind of sadness or regret that 
plays these positive roles or that basic sadness or regret should be accompanied by other 
responses that play them. However, now the danger lurks that the resulting response or mix of 
responses will become as stinging as blame and agential disappointment.
The skeptic’s task is to show that this is false by developing an account of non-blaming 
responses to objectionable conduct that make a good life possible without being as stinging as 
angry blame. It should be clear by now that doing this is not easy.
To sum up, there are good reasons to believe that life without angry blame can be good. 
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Thus, you and your partner would not necessarily lose something valuable if you develop the 
tendency to respond to the other’s objectionable conduct with a certain kind of disappointment 
rather than blame. However, the paper has also presented good reasons to believe that if blame 
would be unfair, unjust, or undeserved, then responding with this kind of disappointment would 
be equally unfair, unjust, or undeserved. Therefore, we should reject the blame-skeptical claim 
that we have reasons--grounded in fairness, desert, or justice--to replace angry blame with this 
kind of disappointment. Whether other non-blaming alternatives fare better in this respect is an 
open question. But the arguments presented in this paper raise doubts that they do and put a 
burden on blame skeptics to show that some alternative would fare better.
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